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1Abstract
This paper explores historical and current regulation by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of
the most widely-used class of antidepressant drugs, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). To
begin, I discuss the evolution of societal understanding of depression, and I highlight the pharmaceutical
industry’s role in shaping the public perception of the condition. Next, I describe the major classes
of antidepressants, focusing on SSRIs and their promise of relief for depressed individuals, as well as
their economic beneﬁts to their manufacturers. Then I explore and analyze several interesting chal-
lenges posed by SSRIs and other psychotropic medications for the new drug application (NDA) process.
Subsequent sections chronicle and critique two noteworthy FDA advisory committee hearings on the
potential connection between SSRIs and suicidal and other violent tendencies in patients who take the
drugs. Throughout the paper, I attempt to show that the agency strives admirably to fulﬁll its regu-
latory mandates that only safe and eﬀective drugs reach the American consumer, and that prescribers
and patients are aware of known risks. FDA considers varied and passionate viewpoints on the subject
of SSRIs, and although it cannot ever entirely satisfy all interested parties, the agency seems to have
recently struck an appropriate balance between widespread access to these drugs and warnings about
their potential harms.
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4I. Introduction
The debate over governmental regulation of antidepressants in the United States is dominated by several
players, including the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), pharmaceutical companies, the mental
health industry, and the public. This paper focuses on the most widely-prescribed class of antidepres-
sants, called selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), which include well-known brand-name drugs
like Prozac, Paxil, and Zoloft. It explores the condition we know as depression; chronicles the devel-
opment of antidepressants and the enormous impact of SSRIs; discusses regulation regarding SSRIs;
describes the inﬂuence competing voices have had on their regulation; and critiques governmental action
in this arena.
5During the second half of the twentieth century, people increasingly began to view depression as a
physiologically-based illness, and the stigmatization of depression started to subside. The discovery of
drugs to combat the illness led depressed individuals, their friends and families, and consumer represen-
tatives to clamber for FDA approval of, and widespread access to, these promising new medications. The
discovery of SSRIs appeared particularly auspicious because these drugs were reported to cause fewer
and less serious side eﬀects than their predecessor antidepressants and were easier to use.
Ever looking to their bottom lines, the pharmaceutical industry in the last decade or so fueled these
ﬁres via direct-to-consumer advertising and public education campaigns that further raised the public’s
awareness of depression as well as its demand for SSRIs. Some critics of the drug industry assert that
the pharmaceutical companies fostered the growth of a market for their antidepressant products by
manufacturing (or at least manipulating public perception of) the “disease” of depression.
FDA’s role in the regulation of antidepressants, as with all drugs, is to ensure that those that reach the
American consumer are safe and eﬀective for their intended uses. During the New Drug Application
(NDA) approval process, FDA conducts a form of cost-beneﬁt analysis based on data from trials provided
by the drug’s sponsor. The agency may approve a drug with higher risks so long as it shows promising
clinical results, and conversely it may require less proof of eﬃcacy for a drug that appears very safe.
Showing the eﬃcacy of antidepressants is particularly challenging in that measuring their salutary eﬀects
is relatively subjective. Seeing improvements in depressed patients is less objective than seeing improve-
ments in cardiac patients, for example. Given the relative diﬃculty of disproving data that relies in part
on subjective observations, FDA may have given clinical data for SSRIs the beneﬁt of the doubt during
the NDA process because these promising new drugs appeared to have few major side eﬀects.
Some members of the public and the mental health community have raised ﬂags regarding the safety
and eﬃcacy of certain antidepressants. They assert that the long-term eﬀects of antidepressant use are
alarming, and they blame FDA for not acting more quickly to warn the public of such eﬀects. There
have also arisen concerns that antidepressant use may cause suicidal and other violent tendencies in some
users. Thrown into the mix of what FDA considers when making regulatory decisions about antidepres-
sants is powerful anecdotal evidence from both sides of the debate. There are people who say they could
not live without antidepressants and others who claim that antidepressants have caused their loved ones
to kill themselves. As this paper describes, these opposing perspectives clashed in FDA hearings in 1991
and again in 2004 on the possible link between SSRIs and suicide and other violence. That FDA decided
not to require labeling changes in 1991 but made the opposite decision in 2004 reﬂects the impact that
public opinion and mounting scientiﬁc evidence have on the agency.
All in all, given the information available to the agency, FDA regulation of SSRIs in the United States
appears to strike an appropriate balance between allowing access to these very beneﬁcial drugs and pro-
tecting the public against their potentially serious but rare side eﬀects. That said, there remains room
for improvement in the way that antidepressants are prescribed, advertised, and labeled in this country.
6II. The Condition to be Treated: Depression
A. Brief History of Depression
Although the clinical description and understanding of depression have been signiﬁcantly reﬁned in
modern times, people have long recognized that some individuals suﬀer from severe sadness and immo-
bilization. Hippocrates and Aretaeus, ancient Greek physicians, wrote about patients with a depressive
illness they termed melancholia, a condition named after the bodily humor they believed inﬂuenced
mood.1 From ancient times through the middle of the nineteenth century, the common perception was
that people were either entirely sane and in control of themselves, or utterly mad and possessing no
control over their faculties; little middle ground existed in the public understanding.2
7While the concept of depression has ancient roots, its classiﬁcation as a clinical disorder did not occur
until the birth of psychiatry in the nineteenth century.3 During the 1800s in Western Europe, the
creation of the ﬁrst modern asylums—meant for treating people with mental problems rather than
merely sequestering them—resulted in hundreds of so-called “lunatics” being in the same place at the
same time.4 This phenomenon, in conjunction with the rise of the statistical movement, led observers to
conclude that in fact there were many varieties and degrees of intensity of “insanity,” or mental illness.5
This view slowly replaced the all-or-nothing view of mental illness that had previously prevailed in the
public mind.
Based on his observations at asylums, the Frenchman Jean-Etiene-Dominique Esquirol published an
inﬂuential classiﬁcation of mental illnesses, in which he distinguished full from partial insanity. He termed
partial insanities “monomanias,” and stated that patients who suﬀered from these seemed generally
reasonable but had some limited aﬄiction of judgment, mood, or will.6 Esquirol’s great contribution
to modern psychiatry was the notion that a mental disorder was not a disorder of the whole person,
but rather a speciﬁc disease that perhaps could be speciﬁcally treated.7 The German psychiatrist Emil
Kraepelin was also a pioneer in the burgeoning ﬁeld in the second half of the nineteenth century; his
Textbook of Psychiatry distinguished among diﬀerent types of mental illness and coined terms like “manic
depressive disorder” that are still in use today.8
B. Modern Clinical Deﬁnition of Depression
8Attempts to describe and classify diﬀerent types of mental illnesses in general, and depression in
particular, have persisted since Esquirol and Kraepelin wrote their seminal works.9 Although there
remains uncertainty among experts regarding subtypes of depression (e.g., endogenous depression,
reactive depression, etc.), the medical profession generally agrees on the typical symptoms of depression.
The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV
(DSM-IV) deﬁnes unipolar depression (as opposed to bipolar depression, which refers to disorders that
involve mania) as “a disturbance in mood characterized by varying degrees of sadness, disappointment,
loneliness, hopelessness, self-doubt, and guilt.”10 Depressed people may have a harder time conducting
their usual daily activities but they may still be able to cope.11 According to the DSM-IV, a person
suﬀering from major unipolar depression must have a depressed mood and/or markedly diminished
pleasure in most activities consistently over the course of a two-week period.12 In addition, the disorder
is characterized by the presence of a majority of the other symptoms, listed below:
•
signiﬁcant weight loss or gain (i.e., a change of more than 5% of body weight
in a month) or decrease or increase in appetite nearly every day;
•
inability to sleep or excessive sleep;
• psychomotor agitation or retardation;
•
fatigue or loss of energy;
•
feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt;
9•
diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness; and
• recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent thoughts of suicide, or attempt to commit
suicide.13
Curiously, although experts agree on the symptoms, no one really knows the exact causes or neurological
eﬀects of depression. There appears to be some connection between genetics and depression; people
whose relatives have suﬀered from depression are more likely to suﬀer from it.14 Sometimes physically
or mentally stressful events cause depression. For example, medical problems like strokes, heart attacks,
cancer, and hormonal disorders can cause depressive illnesses, as can serious emotional setbacks like
ﬁnancial or relationship problems or the loss of a loved one.15 Other causes of depression include misuse
of drugs or alcohol; physical, emotional, or sexual abuse; and major life changes, such as moving or
retirement.16 Sometimes, particularly once a person has had previous depressive episodes, depression
occurs for no apparent reason at all.17
There is general agreement in the medical community that depression is associated with changes in brain
chemistry and function.18 Research has proven that the brains of people with depression are abnormal;
speciﬁcally, the hippocampus is 9 to 13% smaller in women with a history of depression as compared
to women who have never been depressed.19 The hippocampus is a part of the brain that is vital to
the storage of memories, and a smaller hippocampus contains fewer receptors for the neurotransmitter
serotonin, which modulates mood, emotion, sleep, and appetite.20 Depression is thus correlated with
an imbalance in the way the brain regulates serotonin,21 and, as will be discussed later, SSRIs work by
correcting this imbalance. What remains unknown is whether the altered brain chemistry of depressed
individuals is a cause or a result of depression.22
13Id.
10C. Societal De-Stigmatization of Depression
While experts honed the clinical deﬁnition of depression, the public perception of the condition has
dramatically transformed since 1950. In the 1950s, estimates were that 50 people per million suﬀered
from depression, whereas today the estimate is 100,000 per million.23 Approximately 10 to 20% of adults
today experience depression during their lifetimes.24 Although it may well be the case that many more
people are depressed now than 50 years ago, such a dramatic increase must be at least in part the result
of a societal re-conceptualization of what it means to be depressed.
Many believe that this evolution of public understanding of depression is a very positive occurrence
in that it has resulted in less “blaming the victim” of a debilitating condition. Throughout history
until recent decades, “melancholia” and depression were thought to be moral, personal failings. People
blamed themselves for feeling hopeless, sad, and empty, and they thought that if they could only improve
their attitudes or change something about their situation, they would overcome their negative feelings.
Depressed people were much less likely to admit their condition or to seek help, and there was little
help available to those who did seek treatment. However, in recent decades, people have come to view
depression as a physiologically-based condition for which the person suﬀering from it is not responsible.
The stigma of mental illnesses in general, and depression in particular, has greatly subsided. Granted,
some stigma persists today; a 1996 survey of 1,166 American adults revealed that 54% still believe
depression is a “sign of weakness.”25 However, that same survey showed however that 69% would
take an antidepressant if prescribed by a doctor,26 indicating that even some who view depression as a
character ﬂaw realize that it has bases in biology and can be treated by medicine.
11Society today commonly understands depression to be a disorder of the brain. Information published
by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) states that evidence from neuroscience, genetics,
and clinical investigation demonstrate this fact.27 The NIMH website informs the public: “A depressive
disorder is an illness that involves the body, mood, and thoughts. It aﬀects the way a person eats and
sleeps, the way one feels about oneself, and the way one thinks about things. A depressive disorder is
not the same as a passing blue mood. It is not a sign of personal weakness or a condition that can be
willed or wished away. People with a depressive illness cannot merely ‘pull themselves together’ and
get better. Without treatment, symptoms can last for weeks, months, or years. Appropriate treatment,
however, can help most people who suﬀer from depression.”28
The American Medical Association (AMA) echoes the sentiment that physiology, not personal weakness,
is to blame for depression: “It is important for a person who is depressed—and his or her family, friends
and co-workers—to understand that depression is a disease. A depressed person has not caused these
feelings and cannot simply decide to snap out of it and stop being depressed.”29 Mental health advocates
generally think that the public realization that depression is an illness is beneﬁcial because it encourages
depressed people to seek and obtain treatment, whether in the form of psychotherapy or medication or
both. People are indeed seeking out help for depression in record numbers; a recent survey shows that
depression is the 11th most common reason for patients to visit their family physicians in the U.S.30
D. Role of the Pharmaceutical Industry in Changing Perceptions of Depression
12Drug companies help to de-stigmatize depression further by corroborating the widely-accepted notion
that it is a treatable illness in their promotional materials for SSRIs. The website for Paxil emphasizes
that depression is a mental condition from which approximately 16% of Americans suﬀer in any given
year.31 The Prozac website states: “Depression is a real illness, not a weakness...[and] it doesn’t reveal
a personal weakness or inability to cope.”32 Not surprisingly, all of the websites for SSRIs stress that
depression is a treatable condition, and they imply that the drugs they are advertising can be part of a
successful treatment program.
Some observers assert that the pharmaceutical industry is largely responsible for the evolution in societal
perceptions of depression. Dr. David Healy, a British psychiatrist and leading historian of psychophar-
macology, states: “[D]rug companies obviously make drugs, but less obviously they make views of
illnesses.”33 He argues that they accomplish this by selectively supporting certain scientiﬁc studies and
views rather than others in order to create demand for medicines that they have discovered to be eﬀective
in treating certain conditions.34 He points to an example from the early history of psychopharmacology:
in order to promote an antidepressant called amitriptyline, Merck marketed the idea of depression as
an illness by purchasing and disseminating 50,000 copies of a book on recognizing and treating depres-
sion.35 Dr. Healy says this practice continues today, as drug companies invest in campaigns by mental
health associations aimed at raising awareness and combating insuﬃcient diagnosis and treatment of
depression.36 Put another way, Dr. Healy says: “Although there are clearly psychobiological inputs to
many psychiatric disorders, we are at present in a state where companies can not only seek to ﬁnd the
key to the lock but can dictate a great deal of the shape of the lock to which a key must ﬁt.”37
13Dr. Healy thinks it somewhat inevitable that drug companies have “created” diseases. He points to the
1962 Kefauver-Harris amendments to the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act as channeling drug development
toward clear diseases.38 By requiring drugs to be proven eﬀective as well as safe in order to garner FDA
approval, the amendments favored drugs that could be shown to treat an identiﬁable, symptomatic, and
measurable condition.39 Thus, in order to market a drug in the U.S., pharmaceutical companies must
be able to claim that the drug is eﬀective in treating a certain disease-like condition, as opposed to
improving health and well-being generally. As a result, the industry tends to view conditions as diseases
and to shape public opinion in that direction.40
Whereas Dr. Healy sees the pharmaceutical company’s role in shaping the public perception of depression
as preordained by the existing regulatory structure, Dr. Joseph Glenmullen, a clinical instructor in
psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and practicing psychiatrist, oﬀers a more cynical view in his 2000
book Prozac Backlash.41 Glenmullen accuses the drug companies of buying the credibility of academic
institutions and mounting “public interest” campaigns that are really aimed only at creating a market for
their antidepressant drugs.42 Increasingly, drug companies are entering into partnerships with academic
institutions whereby the companies provide funding for research and in return retain rights over the
results, including in some cases the right to suppress information discovered in the course of research.43
An example of drug companies’ power to control research occurred in the 1980s, when Upjohn generously
ﬁnanced a study on one of its anti-anxiety drugs until it found out that the results were going to be
unfavorable to its product.44 At that point, the company not only discontinued funding for the study
but also encouraged other professionals to criticize the study. 45
14Dr. Glenmullen also looks critically at public education campaigns like National Depression Day and
automated telephonic screening services that are funded by drug companies; he views such eﬀorts as
manipulative attempts by the industry to artiﬁcially increase demand for antidepressants while posing as
good corporate citizens.46 He asserts that this type of marketing of a psychiatric diagnosis has redeﬁned
depression to include those suﬀering relatively mild symptoms, and that such eﬀorts do more harm than
good by convincing relatively healthy people who experience normal, albeit unpleasant, emotions that
they suﬀer from major depression.47 These people tell their doctors they think they are depressed, and
many doctors obligingly yet inappropriately prescribe antidepressants.
Undoubtedly the drug companies have acted in a self-interested, proﬁt-driven way in promoting awareness
of depression. Approval or disapproval of the industry’s conduct turns to some degree on what exactly
one thinks depression is. If depression is indeed a common medical condition with some physiological
bases that can be treated with drugs and/or psychotherapy, the fact that drug companies have made
more people aware of depression is good. More depressed people will seek and obtain help, and families,
friends, and co-workers of depressed people will be more understanding and supportive of those that suﬀer
from the illness. On the other hand, if one thinks that the current popular understanding of depression
is far too inclusive and that only the most severe cases are in fact depression, then the drug companies
conduct is indeed deplorable, as Glenmullen argues. Seen in this light, the industry’s marketing eﬀorts
have deluded many into thinking they can get a “quick ﬁx” for their problems by popping a pill instead
of pursuing more productive solutions.
III. Overview of Antidepressants
15The previous section gave a brief history of depression, discussed the modern clinical understanding of
the disorder, and described the evolution of its public perception, emphasizing the inﬂuence the drug
companies have exerted in this area. This section will set the stage for a discussion of FDA approval
and regulation of antidepressants by oﬀering succint histories of the drugs and explanations of how they
work. Three main classes of drugs are used in the treatment of major depression: monoamine oxidase
inhibitors (MAOIs), tricyclics, and SSRIs. SSRIs are by far the most popular of these drugs today, and
they are also the most controversial, as this paper highlights.
16A. Older Antidepressants
17Discovered serendipitously in the 1950s, an MAOI called iproniazid was the ﬁrst modern antidepres-
sant.48 It was initially developed to ﬁght tuberculosis, but when it was observed to elevate mood and
stimulate activity in many patients, researchers believed it could be used to treat depression.49 In the
late 1950s, over 400,000 depressed people took the drug before toxic side eﬀects led to its discontinu-
ation.50 Subsequent research has shown that MAOIs work by slowing the breakdown in the brain of
certain neurotransmitters, including serotonin and others, thus enabling them to assist communication
among brain cells for longer periods.51 They accomplish this by blocking the activity of monoamine ox-
idase, the enzyme that destroys these transmitters and gives this class of antidepressants their name.52
MAOIs have a number of side eﬀects, the most dire of which is that they can result in death if taken in
combination with pickles, red wine, beer, or dairy products.53
The ﬁrst tricyclic antidepressant, called imipramine, was also initially developed for use in the treatment
of an indication other than depression.54 After clinical trials failed to show its eﬀectiveness in treating
schizophrenia, other studies in 1957 and 1958 found that imipramine signiﬁcantly alleviated symptoms
of depression.55 Interestingly, the studies found that although the drug seemed to activate depressed
patients, improving their mood and energizing them, it actually had a sedative eﬀect on non-depressed
individuals.56 These results led to the idea that tricyclics somehow work by reversing the depression,
rather than simply causing a general activation in patients.57 Later biochemical studies showed that
tricyclic antidepressants do this by increasing the activity of neurotransmitters, once again including
serotonin and others, by limiting their reuptake into neurons.58 Despite their beneﬁcial signiﬁcant bene-
ﬁts, tricyclics cause a number of side eﬀects of varying severity, including weight gain, dizziness, blurred
vision, sweating, constipation, sedation, and even cardiovascular problems.59 In addition, they can be
dangerous or even deadly in the case of overdose, a particularly serious concern for depressed patients
who have a much greater tendency than the average person to attempt suicide.60
18B. SSRIs
1. Promising Medications
The December 1987 introduction of Prozac by Eli Lilly, the ﬁrst SSRI, marked a milestone for the
treatment of depression. SSRIs work in generally the same way as the tricyclics, in that both classes of
antidepressants improve mood by correcting a deﬁcit in neurotransmitter activity that accompanies de-
pression.61 However, where tricyclics increase the activity of several neurotransmitters, SSRIs selectively
inhibit the reuptake of serotonin alone (hence their name, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors).62 By
interfering less with brain function, SSRIs alleviate depression without causing many of the side eﬀects
caused by tricyclics.63 For example, clinical studies on Prozac showed a lower incidence of the following
adverse reactions associated with tricyclics: cardiac eﬀects, drowsiness, dizziness, and weight gain.64
Another advantage of Prozac over the older antidepressants is that their administration is much easier
and more convenient. Whereas doctors have to use blood tests to determine the appropriate dose of
tricyclics for each individual patient, the more focused nature of Prozac eliminates the need for blood
testing. 65 Rather, most patients can take a daily dose of one or two 20-milligram capsules of the drug.66
19In less than two years after hitting the market in 1988, Prozac became the best-selling antidepressant
in history.67 Prozac success stories abounded in the press and in communities; people who had suﬀered
from depression throughout their lives and had unsuccessfully tried other treatments eﬀectively managed
their condition by using Prozac. A March 1990 Newsweek cover story entitled “The Promise of Prozac”
touted the drug as a medical breakthrough.68 The article recounted the experiences of several depressed
patients, such as that of a 39-year-old woman from Seattle named Susan A.69 Susan had suﬀered from
depression, bulimia, and drug and alcohol abuse, and she had tried to kill herself twice. She had tried
a tricyclic antidepressant but discontinued treatment because she did not like how it made her feel.70
After her doctor prescribed Prozac, however, Susan turned her life around; she kicked her drug and
alcohol habit, returned to school, and landed a full-time job.71 According to the Newsweek article, as
well as many reports since then, Prozac has successfully improved the lives of millions of people as it
did Susan’s.
Sales of Prozac reached $350 million in 1989, more than total sales of all antidepressants just two
years earlier. 72 Even healthy people were requesting Prozac.73 The popularity of Prozac and the
SSRIs that followed can be attributed to the fact that they are far easier to tolerate than previous
antidepressants while being similarly eﬀective in treating depression. Research has shown that any of
the antidepressants on the market—including tricyclics and SSRIs—will produce a favorable clinical
response in approximately 70% of patients.74 Referring to the targeted action of SSRIs, Dr. James
Halikas, a professor of psychiatry at the Universtiy of Minnesota, noted, “Instead of using a shotgun [to
stimulate serotonin activity], you’re using a bullet.”75
2. Concerns about Side Eﬀects
20That said, from the beginning of the SSRI era, there were voices cautioning against seeing the new
drugs as a “magic bullet.”76 Eli Lilly itself conceded that Prozac should be handled with care.77 SSRIs
cause their own set of side eﬀects, albeit most are less common and severe than those caused by earlier
generations of antidepressants. A signiﬁcant number of people on Prozac, for instance, have reported
headaches, nausea, insomnia, and nervousness.78 In addition, SSRIs may cause other short- and long-
term side eﬀects, the severity or frequency of which were not discovered or publicized during clinical
testing. The controversial claim that SSRI use may lead to violence and/or suicide in a small fraction
of people who use them will be discussed at length later.
Drug industry critics point to numerous other adverse reactions to SSRIs—including weight gain, sexual
dysfunction, and tremors—that they say occur much more often in practice than is indicated by the drug
labeling. For example, Dr. Glenmullen reports that sexual side eﬀects occur in 60% of patients who
take Prozac, 79 whereas Eli Lilly’s oﬃcial product information lists the incidence of sexual side eﬀects
as 2 to 5%.80
Serious withdrawal problems from SSRIS are another side eﬀect on which Dr. Glenmullen focuses and
about which healthcare providers need to be aware. Clinical tests, as well as anecdotal evidence, reveal
that some patients experience dizziness, hallucinations, blurred vision, irritability, tingling or electric
shock sensations, vivid dreams, nervousness, melancholy, and/or ﬂu-like symptoms upon ceasing SSRI
treatment.81 Such symptoms usually last for days or weeks, but can last much longer.82 Prozac very
rarely causes such withdrawal eﬀects; due to its long half-life, it slowly washes out of the body after the
patient stops taking it.83 Paxil, on the other hand, has a much shorter half-life and its discontinuation
can cause acute withdrawal.84
21Dr. Glenmullen asserts, “As with other serious, long-term side eﬀects of these drugs, the frequency of
withdrawal phenomena cited by pharmaceutical companies is much lower than what one sees in clinical
practice and has now been demonstrated in the studies that are available.”85 He cites a study showing
that withdrawal symptoms occur in Paxil in as many as 50% of patients,86 many times the 2.0 to 7.1%
cited on the Paxil label.87
Another concern regarding SSRIs is that therapists and other doctors are prescribing SSRIs to people
without taking the time to make sure that they are in fact depressed.88 Doctors rarely prescribe the
older antidepressants to a patient without conducting a full physical and psychological exam due to
the high risk proﬁles of those drugs.89 However, due to the convenience and apparent safety of SSRIs,
some physicians prescribe them without undertaking such exams, which might for example show that
a patient’s unhappiness is caused by something that drugs are unlikely to ﬁx, such as job loss or other
misfortune.90
Psychiatrist Peter Kramer’s 1993 book Listening to Prozac chronicled and contributed to the fame of
Prozac, which at the time of publication had been on the market for ﬁve years. In the book, Kramer
reports from his professional experience that Prozac treats depression quickly and dramatically in a wide
range of patients. He states: “Prozac seemed to give social conﬁdence to the habitually timid, to make
the sensitive brash, to lend the introvert the social skills of the salesman.”91 In this statement, Kramer
professes admiration for the eﬀectiveness of the drug but simultaneously hints at an attribute of Prozac
that disturbs him.
22Speciﬁcally, Kramer ﬁnds that the changes in brain chemistry caused by the drug, in addition to making
people feel better, also contribute to noticeable alterations in patients’ personalities. Some people who
previously were cautious became assertive on Prozac; some who had been contrary became ﬂexible and
agreeable. Such a change caused Kramer and his patients to question which self was the patient’s
“real” self, the pre- or post-Prozac one. Kramer dubbed this transformative eﬀect of SSRIs “cosmetic
pharmacology,”92 a concept which continues to be profoundly disturbing to many today.
Despite some negative attention, on the whole the medical profession, the public, and the media embraced
Prozac, thrilled to have a medicine that quickly and safely treats people suﬀering from depression.
Attracted by the huge success of Prozac, other pharmaceutical companies developed and marketed their
own SSRIs. Pﬁzer introduced Zoloft in 1991; GlaxoSmithKline followed with Paxil in 1992; and Forest
Labs with Celexa in 1998 and Lexapro in 2002.93 By 1997, three SSRIs were among the 20 most-
prescribed drugs in the U.S.94 Prozac came in ﬁfth; Zoloft 11th; and Paxil 17th.95
3. Cash Cows for Drug Manufacturers
These drugs as a class continue to meet with enormous commercial success. In 2003, Paxil had U.S. sales
of roughly $2 billion, and Zoloft had roughly $2.8 billion.96 Global sales of antidepressants ranked third
among therapy classes in 2003, bringing in $19.5 billion.97 That said, SSRI sales are likely to stall during
the next decade due to the loss of patent protection and generic competition.98 Patent protection for
Prozac expired in 2001 and for Paxil in 2003.99 As shown in the chart below, Eli Lilly annual reports for
the past four years reveal both how extremely lucrative Prozac was for Lilly, as well how dramatically
generic competition can aﬀect sales of brand-name drugs.
23Sales of Prozac and Related Fluoxetine Products
Year U.S. Sales Sales Outside U.S. Total Sales
2000100 $2.23
bil-
lion
$341
mil-
lion
$2.57
bil-
lion
2001101 $1.66 billion $330.1 million $1.99 billion
2002102 $451.7
mil-
lion*
$282
mil-
lion
$733.7
mil-
lion
2003103 $398.6 million $246.5 million $645.1 million
*Due to generic competition commencing in early August 2001, sales of Prozac declined 73% from 2001
to 2002.
IV. FDA Approval of SSRIs for the Treatment of Depression
A. Overview of the New Drug Approval Process
As with all new drugs, FDA must ﬁnd that an antidepressant is both safe and eﬀective for its intended
uses before approving it for the U.S. market.104 Of course, if this statutory requirement were interpreted
to require absolute safety, meaning the drug must pose zero risk, very few if any new drugs would ever
be approved. Thus, FDA has traditionally interpreted its mandate to mean that it should approve only
those drugs for which the beneﬁts outweigh the risks.105
100Eli Lilly and Company, 2000 Annual Report (2001).
101Eli Lilly and Company, 2001 Annual Report (2002).
102Eli Lilly and Company, 2002 Annual Report (2003).
103Eli Lilly and Company, 2003 Annual Report (2004).
24In seeking approval, the drug’s sponsor, usually the manufacturer, submits to FDA an NDA, which
includes results from trials conducted on animals and humans during the Investigational New Drug
(IND) phase of development as well as information about how the drug is manufactured and how it
works in the body.106 FDA’s role is to evaluate the studies contained in the NDA quickly yet thoroughly
to determine whether the drug meets the safety and eﬃcacy standards.107 To accomplish this task, FDA
employs medical doctors, chemists, statisticians, microbiologists, pharmacologists and other experts.108
Uncertainty is inherent in the process of extrapolating from the results of limited clinical trials to the
population at large, but FDA attempts to minimize this uncertainty by working with sponsors during
the IND phase to design controlled clinical studies.109 The chart below shows when FDA approved
NDAs for ﬁve SSRIs for the treatment of major depressive disorder (MDD).
Date of FDA Approval of Major Brand-Name SSRIs for MDD110
Brand
Name
Active
Ingredient
Manufacturer Date of Initial FDA
Approval for Treatment
of Depression
Prozac Fluoxetine
Hy-
drochlo-
ride
Eli
Lilly
12/29/1987
Zoloft Sertraline
Hydrochloride
Pﬁzer 12/30/1991
Paxil Paroxetine
Hy-
drochlo-
ride
GlaxoSmithKline 12/29/1992
Celexa Citalopram
Hydrobromide
Forest Labs 7/17/1998
Lexapro Escitalopram
Ox-
alate
Forest
Labs
8/14/2002
25B. Critique of IND and NDA Processes for SSRIs
The IND and NDA processes for SSRIs are noteworthy and potentially disturbing in several respects.
Speciﬁcally, sponsors of NDAs for antidepressants face obstacles that many other drug sponsors do not
face during pre-clinical trials due to the diﬃculties of modeling human psychiatric conditions in animals.
Moreover, clinical trials on humans present their own set of problems for antidepressants, in light of the
ill-deﬁned indication to be treated. Critics of the SSRI NDA process claim that the instruments used to
measure eﬃcacy in clinical trials are inadequate and that the trials are too short to establish safety.
1. Pre-Clinical Animal Testing
New drugs are ﬁrst tested on animals to establish a modicum of safety and eﬃcacy. Pre-clinical animal
testing of antidepressants is less reliable than such testing of other, non-psychiatric drugs. In part, this
is because scientists still do not totally understand exactly how depression works biologically in humans,
so they cannot duplicate it in animals. A 1998 study in Psychological Medicine concludes: “[S]tudies
in animals, although necessary, must be regarded with caution” due in part to the fact that there is no
“single theory about the pathogenesis and therapy of depression.”111 FDA recognizes this obstacle and
states in its Guidelines for the Clinical Evaluation of Antidepressant Drugs that “adequate models of
human psychiatric illnesses are nonexistent.”112
26Additionally, whereas a researcher can easily assess the eﬃcacy of an antibiotic by seeing if an infection
is killed in a rat, assessing the eﬃcacy of antidepressants in animals is much more challenging since
researchers cannot interview rats to see how depressed they are or how much better they feel after
taking an antidepressant.113 Interestingly, one of the ways that researchers currently use animal models
to ﬁnd potential human antidepressants is by injecting rats with diﬀerent compounds and then looking
for enhanced aggressive behavior, such as moving up in the colony’s dominance hierarchy or exhibiting
violence towards newcomers in the group.114 The theory behind this practice, which is troubling to some
experts, is that drugs that cause such aggression in rats may act to counteract depression in humans.115
2. Measuring Eﬃcacy in Clinical Trials
27Establishing the eﬃcacy of antidepressants during clinical trials on humans is also more challenging than
it is for non-psychiatric drugs. Clinical tests for antibiotics, for example, produce objective data that
reveal whether or not treatment is working.116 Such data includes temperature, blood tests, X-Rays, and
bacterial cultures.117 However, clinical tests on antidepressants cannot show eﬃcacy by relying entirely
on objective physical tests because there is currently no quantitative, universally-accepted diagnostic
criteria for determining whether a patient is depressed or not.118 Thus, SSRI sponsors rely on rating tests,
the most widely used and accepted of which is the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (the Hamilton scale),
to attempt to quantify how depressed a patient is and to measure whether antidepressant treatment is
eﬀective. The FDA guidelines speciﬁcally encourage use of the Hamilton scale and other established
rating systems in clinical tests.119 Accordingly, the studies that established the eﬃcacy of Prozac, Paxil,
Zoloft, and Celexa for the treatment of depression all relied on the Hamilton scale (and in some cases,
other rating scales as well) to show the drugs’ superiority to placebo.120
The Hamilton scale and other rating scales are designed to assign a numerical value to a person’s level
of depression.121 Based on a patient’s answers to standard questions and interviewers’ observations of
the patient’s behavior, the patient is ranked, usually from zero to four, with four representing the most
frequent or severe symptoms, in 17 diﬀerent areas.122 For example, patients rate their feelings of guilt
and suicidality, and interviewers rate observable patient behavior like agitation.123 The scores from each
area are then simply added together to produce a ﬁnal tally, with a higher score representing more severe
depression.124
28The Hamilton scale has generated a fair deal of criticism since its ﬁrst publication in 1960. Many
clinicians are skeptical of the idea that adding up a series of numbers based on diﬀerent items could
produce a value with real meaning; for example, they question whether suicidality and problems sleeping
should be given equal weight in the equation.125 Dr. Glenmullen argues that instead of being scientiﬁc,
the Hamilton and similar scales are entirely subjective.126 He observes that “ethnic, cultural, and
gender diﬀerences in how emotions are experiences and expressed” can greatly aﬀect scores, making
comparisons between patients impossible.127 He further alleges that the Hamilton scale was designed
in a way that highlights those physical symptoms of depression that most respond to antidepressants,
thereby eﬀectively “rigging” clinical tests to show the eﬀectiveness of drug treatment. 128 The Hamilton
scale fails to measure large areas of interpersonal functioning, like whether a patient makes eye contact,
a behavior that turns out to be a good indication of response to treatment.129
FDA acknowledges the shortcomings of the Hamilton scale and other depression rating instruments
currently used: “Although existing assessment measures and study designs are often capable of detecting
clear evidence of clinical drug eﬃcacy, the state-of-the-art in clinical psychopharmacology still requires
the development of new and better techniques. The development of new, potentially useful approaches
to drug evaluation are to be encouraged by the investigators, the industry, and the FDA.”130 In other
words, for the time being, the Hamilton scale is the best available measure of antidepressant eﬃcacy,
but improvements on existing scales are needed.
293. Duration of Clinical Trials
Another area of concern regarding clinical trials of antidepressants is their relatively short duration.
The FDA guidelines state that the therapeutic activity of antidepressants can usually be established
in about four weeks, but also suggest that at least one of the two required studies should run for six
weeks in order to allow for a further assessment of safety.131 However, once an antidepressant has been
approved, physicians are instructed to prescribe it for four to six months,132 and many patients stay on
the drugs much longer. Thus, there is concern that FDA’s recommended duration is too short to show
that an antidepressant is indeed safe when taken for a much longer period of time, as is usually the case
in practice. The chart at the top of the following page presents the lengths of the clinical trials relied
upon in their NDAs by sponsors for ﬁve SSRIs:
30Duration of Clinical Trials for SSRIs for the Treatment of MDD133
Brand
Name
Number of Clinical Trials* Duration of Trails
Prozac 2 5
weeks
and
6
weeks
Zoloft 3 6 weeks, 8 weeks, and 44 weeks**
Paxil 3 12
weeks
and
1
year**
Celexa 2 4 weeks and 6 weeks
Lexapro 4 8
weeks
and
36
weeks**
*This number refers to the clinical studies that provided a basis for a ﬁnding of eﬃcacy in the
NDA; sponsors may have run other tests of varying duration, but they are not required to report
all studies conducted to FDA.
**These three longer trials were all studies of outpatients who had responded to antidepressant
treatment in shorter tests to determine the rate of relapse of MDD. The patients were randomized
to continuation on the drug, or were put on placebo. Patients on the drug in each trial had
signiﬁcantly lower rates of relapse than patients on placebo.
31As can be seen from the chart, most of the clinical studies that drug sponsors have conducted on
antidepressants meet or exceed FDA’s recommended duration, and, perhaps in response to critics, several
sponsors have conducted signiﬁcantly longer tests. Longer clinical trials might be desirable for every
drug from a safety perspective, but on the other hand, the sooner relatively safe and eﬀective drugs
make it to the market, the better. Per usual, FDA has conducted a cost-beneﬁt analysis to determine
the minimum necessary duration of clinical trials for antidepressants.
A related issue is that clinical studies for these drugs are intended primarily to evaluate eﬃcacy and thus
do not systematically monitor subjects after they stop the drug; this set-up is especially problematic
considering withdrawal symptoms that by deﬁnition occur at the end of drug treatment.134 Paxil’s
label does inform readers of possible withdrawal problems. It states that an evaluation of spontaneous
reporting of adverse eﬀects reveals that a signiﬁcant percentage of patients suﬀer the following symptoms
after ceasing drug treatment: dizziness (11.9%), nausea (5.4%), nervousness (2.4%), and a number of
other symptoms including electric shock sensations.135 Thus, a meticulous prescriber or patient might
be aware of this particular risk, but FDA should mandate additional, systematic monitoring of clinical
subjects to provide a more accurate picture of the incidence of withdrawal symptoms, rather than relying
on spontaneous reporting.
V. On-Going FDA Regulation of SSRIs
A. Overview of FDA’s Post-Market Regulatory Responsibilities
32FDA’s regulatory mandate does not end after it approves drugs for market. The agency’s Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) maintains a Post-Marketing Surveillance system to monitor
the on-going safety of marketed drugs.136 FDA regulations require periodic reports of all information
relating to a drug’s safety and eﬀectiveness.137 Accordingly, antidepressant manufacturers provide FDA
with regular updates on their products, including any reported adverse eﬀects. In 1993, FDA initiated a
new program called “MEDWatch” to promote voluntary reporting of serious side eﬀects by health care
professionals and consumers.138 Among the purposes of MEDWatch are to keep FDA, the healthcare
industry, and consumers more informed about potential risks of drugs.139 When FDA reassesses drugs
based on data learned after the drug is marketed, it often recommends ways to appropriately manage
newly-discovered risks.140 FDA also continues to monitor drug labels, marketing, and advertising to
ensure that they are truthful and balanced.141
In attempting to carry out these regulatory responsibilities as they relate to SSRIs, FDA has held two
signiﬁcant public hearings over the course of the past 13 years to determine whether there is suﬃcient
evidence regarding a possible causal connection between the drugs and suicide and/or other violence.
This section of the paper will brieﬂy discuss the role of FDA’s advisory committees in the regulatory
process, and then it will chronicle and analyze the 1991 and 2004 hearings and resulting FDA action.
B. Role of FDA Advisory Committees
33FDA relies on technical and scientiﬁc advisory committees to provide independent advice that will
contribute to the quality of agency decision-making and lend credibility to the product review process.142
These committees play a prominent role at the product approval stage, but they also oﬀer advice earlier
in the product development cycle or after a drug is marketed.143 They typically are asked to comment
on whether adequate data supports approval, clearance, or licensing of medical product for marketing.144
Their discussions and ﬁnal votes are non-binding on FDA, but the agency usually follows them.145
The Federal Advisory Committee Act in 1972 prescribed formal use of advisory committees throughout
the federal government.146 The law requires that the committees be “fairly balanced,” meaning as open
and inclusive as possible, both in terms of types of interests represented as well as demographically.147
Most members of FDA’s drug advisory committees are physician-scientists; other members include statis-
ticians, epidemiologists, nutritionists, and toxicologists.148 In addition, almost all committees include
industry and consumer representatives.149 Committees must allocate an hour of each meeting to open
public comment.150
Not all products undergo advisory committee review, and the ones that do usually represent a new
technology or are controversial.151 The decision of whether to involve an advisory committee is usually
made by the division director of one of the FDA’s ﬁve product centers.152 In the hearings described in
the following pages, CDER decided to utilize advisory committees to help it decide how to proceed in
the face of signiﬁcant controversy over potentially very serious side eﬀects of SSRIs. The Psychophar-
macological Drugs Advisory Committee (PDAC) advised CDER in both 1991 and 2004, and PDAC was
joined by the Pediatric Subcommittee of the Anti-Infective Drugs Advisory Committee (Peds AC) in
2004 due to the focus of the later hearing on children. In both instances, FDA followed the committee’s
advice, although as will be seen this advice was very diﬀerent in 2004 than in 1991.
34C. FDA Response to Concerns About SSRI Use and Suicide and Other Violence in Adults
1. Reports of Possible Link Between Prozac and Adult Suicide and Violence
In the early years after Prozac was approved, some alarming evidence came to light indicating that
the drug might cause suicidal tendencies in a small percentage of adult patients who took it. One
of the earliest and most publicized studies on this topic was conducted by Dr. Martin H. Teicher and
other researchers in the Harvard Medical School Department of Psychiatry and reported in the American
Journal of Psychiatry in 1990. 153 In this study, six depressed patients who were previously free of serious
suicidal ideation developed intense and violent preoccupations with suicide after taking Prozac for two to
seven weeks.154 The preoccupations persisted for three days to three months after discontinuation of the
drug.155 As similar reports appeared in other medical publications, Prozac sales slackened somewhat.156
A number of theories exist for why SSRIs may possibly cause suicidal tendencies in patients. One such
theory, and perhaps the most prominent, is that SSRI use may at ﬁrst energize a patient before improving
her mood and cognition, thus mobilizing her to carry out any suicidal thoughts she may have.157 Another
theory is that in some instances, SSRIs are ineﬀective altogether, and that the combination of disease
progression and frustration with the failure of treatment may make patients more desperate.158
35Public interest groups expressed their concern about the alleged link between SSRIs and suicide. The
Public Citizen Health Research Group, a group aﬃliated with consumer rights’ activist Ralph Nader,
petitioned FDA to warn doctors and patients that some people taking Prozac have experienced intense,
violent, suicidal thoughts, agitation and impulsivity after starting treatment with the drug.”159 Prozac’s
label at the time contained a precaution regarding “suicidal ideation,” although it did not state that
Prozac use in fact causes such thoughts.160 A Lilly spokesperson defended against the petition, saying,
“The approved labeling for Prozac is consistent with current medical and scientiﬁc information, and no
additional warnings are needed.161
36The Citizens Commission on Human Rights, a group sponsored by the Church of Scientology, well-
known for its anti-psychiatric stance, mounted a full-frontal attack on the drug.162 In the wake of
Prozac-associated violence, the Church contacted families of some of the victims and persuaded them
to sign a petition for a congressional investigation of the drug.163 The Church took out full-page ads in
USA Today criticizing Eli Lilly, and Scientologists went on television talk shows to air their views on
Lilly and Prozac.164 Experts generally agree, however, that the Church’s attack was based on half-truths
about Prozac. For example, even Dr. Teicher, the lead researcher on the main study relied upon by the
Church and other critics of Prozac, admits that the patients in his study were “complicated, atypical,
depressed patients,” and he continues to prescribe Prozac to some patients, evidencing his continued
faith in the drug.165 Dr. Teicher noted, “[W]hat the Scientologists are doing is presenting the case in a
one-sided, inﬂammatory way.”166
Concern about Prozac’s link to violence was not conﬁned to the Church of Scientology, however. By the
fall of 1991, FDA had received upwards of 14,000 reports of adverse side eﬀects from Prozac, at least 500 of
which involved suicide attempts.167 Dr. Paul Leber, director of FDA’s Division of Neuropharmacological
Drug Products, acknowledged that this was a large number of adverse reaction reports compared to
other drugs, but he noted that the reporting system does not distinguish between reactions to drugs and
underlying conditions.168
2. 1991 FDA Hearing on SSRIs and Adult Suicide and Violence
37In response to the widespread public and professional concern over the possible link between Prozac and
suicidal and other violent tendencies in adults, FDA asked ten psychiatrists and psychologists on the
PDAC to review the issue.169 On Friday, September 20, 1991, the panel convened to hear testimony
from many interested parties and to vote on whether there existed evidence that would justify any kind
of warning on the Prozac label.170
More than twenty witnesses shared tragic tales that they blamed on Prozac.171 They testiﬁed about sons
and daughters who had killed themselves after taking the drug, and about people who had fatally shot
themselves in front of their children.172 Robin Schott of Denton, Maryland, showed the panel scars on her
wrists from where she tried to kill herself shortly after stopping Prozac treatment.173 She acknowledged
that the evidence being presented to the panel was anecdotal but said that it was nonetheless very
real.174
On the other side of the issue, opposing a warning label on Prozac, were some of the country’s top
specialists in treating depression and representatives of patient and family mental health groups.175 Dr.
Carolyn Rabinowitz, deputy medical director of the American Psychiatric Association, asserted that
there was no scientiﬁc evidence indicating that Prozac rather than the underlying depression sparked the
violent behavior.176 Mental health experts stated that violent and suicidal tendencies are characteristic
of depression—for example, John A. Smith, deputy director of the National Mental Health Association,
said that 15% of untreated depressed patients commit suicide, as compared to a much smaller percentage
of the average population.177 Thus, Prozac proponents argued that the drug should not be blamed for
such tragedies, absent greater proof than that provided by a series of anecdotes.178
38In its presentation to the advisory committee, FDA staﬀ gave an update on the substantial number of
spontaneous reports of suicidality associated with the use of Prozac, but they discounted this evidence by
showing that an increase in reporting coincided with publication of the Teicher report and other publicity
of the issue.179 FDA’s presentation indicated a possible area of weakness in the agency’s regulation of
SSRIs and other drugs once they are on the market.180 At the time, there was no systematic regulatory
program in place to monitor or publicize side eﬀects of already-approved drugs.181 Under the system in
place, doctors or patients could take the initiative to report side eﬀects, but such voluntary reporting
captured only a fraction of the true incidence, according to the agency.182 Many of these reports were
ﬁltered through the drug’s manufacture.183 The resulting system was “weak” and “ﬂaw[ed].”184
That said, the doctors and consultants on the panel did not think that SSRIs posed an imminent danger
to the public. At the end of the day, having heard from the many and varied witnesses, the panel
voted six to three to recommend against any label changes warning of suicide or other violent behavior
for Prozac or any other antidepressant drugs.185 They also voted unanimously that there was no sound
evidence linking antidepressants to suicidal or violent behavior.186 FDA followed the advice of the expert
panel and did not require antidepressant manufacturers to place warnings on their labels at that time.187
3. Critique of 1991 FDA Review Process
39Dr. Glenmullen is highly critical of the FDA hearing described above. First, he states that a number
of the panelists had ties to the pharmaceutical industry and should have recused themselves from the
proceedings due to conﬂicts of interest.188 Further, he asserts that FDA knew that Lilly’s clinical studies
of Prozac did not really test whether the drug caused suicidal tendencies.189 Dr. David Graham, section
chief of FDA’s Epidemiology Branch, wrote an internal memo stating that Lilly had acknowledged that
their studies “were not designed for the prospective evaluation of suicidality.”190 Dr. Graham concluded
that Lilly’s data and analysis do not foreclose the possibility that Prozac and violent behavior are re-
lated.191
Moreover, Dr. Glenmullen reports that although four doctors from Eli Lilly were allowed to make formal
presentations before the FDA panel, Dr. Martin Teicher, the Harvard psychiatrist whose reports had
galvanized public outcry for a hearing, was not given this opportunity.192 Even when Dr. Teicher did
speak informally to the panel, the chairman did not permit him to show slides that he had prepared to
support his testimony.193 Glenmullen sees FDA’s denials of Teicher as evidence of the agency’s bias in
favor of the drug companies and against scientists that dare to “rock the boat.”
Finally, Dr. Glenmullen believes that Dr. Paul Leber, the director of FDA’s Division of Neuropharma-
cological Drug Products, had an inappropriately intimate relationship with Eli Lilly, as evidenced by
memos written by Lilly’s chief scientiﬁc oﬃcer, Dr. Leigh Thompson.194 Dr. Thompson at one point
advised colleagues to deliver a report refuting the need to change Prozac’s label to Dr. Leber as quickly
as possible because “he is our defender” within the agency.195
40Based on this evidence indicating that there were conﬂicts of interests within FDA and the appointed
panel and that the panel appeared predisposed to protect Prozac and Eli Lilly, Dr. Glenmullen makes a
compelling argument that the 1991 proceeding may not have adequately protected the public interest.
As will be seen later, perhaps critics like Dr. Glenmullen lost this particular battle but may be destined
to win the war over the connection between SSRIs and violence and suicide.
41D. Suicide Precaution on Current SSRI Labels
SSRI labels do alert physicians and patients who read them closely to the risk of suicide. Consistent
with the ﬁndings of the 1991 FDA panel, the labels seem to blame the risk on the underlying condi-
tion of depression as opposed to on the drug treatment. The alert appears under the section entitled
“Precautions” rather than the more serious “Warnings” section. Thus, the following language appears
on the Paxil label: “The possibility of a suicide attempt is inherent in major depressive disorder and
may persist until signiﬁcant remission occurs. Close supervision of high-risk patients should accompany
initial drug therapy. Prescriptions for PAXIL should be written for the smallest quantity of tablets
consistent with good patient management, in order to reduce the risk of overdose.”196 This precaution
is duplicated almost verbatim on the labels for Prozac, Zoloft, Celexa, and Lexapro.197
Dr. Thomas P. Laughren, team leader of FDA’s Division of Neuropharmacological Drug Products within
the CDER, asserts that this language lends itself to the interpretation that antidepressants may have a
causal role in suicidality early in treatment. 198 He points out that “it has been part of medical lore
for many decades that antidepressants may have an early activating eﬀect that perhaps gives depressed
patients the energy to follow through on suicidal impulses before the mood improvement associated with
antidepressant treatment takes eﬀect.”199 Thus, the label precautions combined with what physicians
learn in medical school and in practice may serve to put concerns about suicide on their radar screen
when treating patients for depression. Despite Laughren’s assertion, however, critics have consistently
called for a more prominent and clear warning for over a decade. Since the 1991 hearing, FDA has
continued to monitor and study the potential SSRI-suicide link amid conﬂicting scientiﬁc reports, but
before 2003 the agency took no further action on this issue.200
E. SSRI Use In Minors
421. Reports of Possible Link Between SSRIs and Pediatric Suicide
None of the SSRIs was initially approved for use in children and adolescents, but they have nonetheless
been prescribed to the pediatric population in large numbers. Once FDA approves a drug for adults,
physicians can prescribe it “oﬀ-label” for anybody, even though many drugs work diﬀerently in people
of diﬀerent ages. Studies indicate that depression occurs in as many as 10% of youth.201 In 1994,
doctors wrote approximately 200,000 prescriptions for Prozac and 300,000 for Zoloft for children aged
ﬁve to 10 years old, and another 150,000 prescriptions of each for teen-agers.202 More than 10 million
antidepressant prescriptions were written for children in 2002.203 One study published in the Archives of
General Psychiatry concluded that about one percent of children in the U.S. are treated for depression
annually, with 57% of those taking antidepressants, the vast majority of which are SSRIs.204
Treatment guidelines recommend prescribing antidepressants only for children with severe depressions
and those for whom therapy fails.205 In light of these narrow guidelines, Dr. Marc Olfson, professor
of clinical psychiatry at Columbia University and lead author of the study from Archives of General
Psychiatry cited above, expressed surprise and dismay at the high percentage of children on antidepres-
sants.206 He attributes the phenomenon to the dearth of trained child psychiatrists and psychologists,
which may lead to reliance by non-experts on prescriptions, and to the ﬁnancial incentives provided by
managed care companies, which make drugs cheaper than therapy for families and insurance plans.207
43Perhaps even more than is the case with adult depression and treatment, public controversy rages
over the beneﬁts and risks of the use of antidepressant drugs in children and adolescents. The lack of
clinical data coupled with anecdotal evidence about suicidality in youth on SSRIs led to a demand for
investigation into the eﬀects of these drugs on minors. Recognizing the risks of inadequate drugs studies
on young people coupled with widespread oﬀ-label use of drugs in that population, Congress attempted
to encourage additional research on pediatric patients with the FDA Modernization Act of 1997.208
This act authorized FDA to grant so-called “pediatric exclusivity” for pharmaceutical manufacturers
who conducted studies of their drugs in children in compliance with FDA regulations.209 FDA thus
incentivizes research on youth drug treatment by oﬀering pharmaceutical companies six months of extra
patent protection from generics on all uses of the tested drug, including adult uses.210 Sponsors of all
of the major SSRIs responded by conducting clinical trials of these drugs on children.211 Prozac alone
was proven eﬀective in this population and thus garnered FDA approval for use for pediatric major
depressive disorder.212 In contrast, FDA’s review of trials for Zoloft, Paxil, Luvox, and Celexa did not
result in their approval for the pediatric population.213
2. FDA Response
44FDA has focused on the issue of a causal connection between SSRIs and suicide in children in the
past year. Recent litigation involving claims against SSRI manufacturers has uncovered information
previously unpublished by drug companies, which are not required by law or regulations to publish all
relevant data on their products.214 This newly-public data exacerbated worries that the drugs are not
as safe and eﬀective as they were previously believed to be. On June 19, 2003, FDA issued a talk
paper recommending that doctors not prescribe Paxil for people under 18 for the treatment of MDD,
due to a possible increased risk of suicidal thinking and suicide attempts in such patients.215 This
recommendation was based on analysis of data provided to FDA by GlaxoSmithKline pursuant to the
pediatric exclusivity provision.216 FDA said that it was reviewing the evidence to determine whether
Paxil contributes to suicidality in minors.217 Due to the aforementioned potential withdrawal eﬀects,
however, FDA cautioned against sudden discontinuation of the drug.218
Several months later, on October 27, 2003, FDA issued a public health advisory calling attention to
reports of suicidal ideation and suicide attempts in clinical trials for various SSRIs in children with
major depressive disorder.219 It reminded prescribers of the precaution printed on all antidepressant
labels advising that prescriptions be written for the smallest amount of the drug necessary for proper
patient care.220 The advisory acknowledged that suicidality is associated with depression, but stated
that preliminary data suggests that its incidence was higher in patients on antidepressants than those
taking placebo.221 An article in The New York Times suggested that this October advisory backed oﬀ
the June advisory discouraging Paxil use and made “clear the agency has grown increasingly skeptical
that there is any link between antidepressant use and the risk of suicide in teenagers and children.”222
45FDA conducted a preliminary review of reports for eight antidepressants studied pursuant to the pe-
diatric exclusivity provision discussed above, and the agency determined that more data, analysis, and
public discussion were necessary.223 Thus, FDA announced intentions to hold an advisory committee on
February 2, 2004, before the PDAC and Peds AC.224
Heightening public anxiety on the matter, in December 2003 the British Medicines and Healthcare
Products Regulatory Agency, Britain’s version of FDA, issued a strong warning against SSRI use in
children, citing evidence of a two- to three-fold increase in suicidal thinking with some of the drugs.225
The British health authorities determined that the risks of the drugs outweigh their beneﬁts for young
people.226 Commentators say that the warning eﬀectively bans the prescription of SSRIs for children in
Britain.227 However, the British agency exempted Prozac from this warning, saying that it alone among
SSRIs is more beneﬁcial than risky.228
3. 2004 FDA Hearing on SSRIs and Suicidality in Minors
The public notice of the February 2, 2004, advisory committee meeting summarized its purpose in the
following way: “The committee will consider optimal approaches to the analysis of data from [clinical
trials for various antidepressant drugs in pediatric patients with MDD], and the results of analyses
conducted to date, with regard to the question of what regulatory action may be needed pertinent to
the clinical use of these products in pediatric patients. The committee will also consider further research
needs to address questions on this topic.”229 There was no expectation that deﬁnitive action would be
taken on February 2nd. In his opening remarks at the hearing, Dr. Russell Katz, Director of the Division
of Neuropharmacological Drug Products, asserted that FDA needed more time to review the “chaotic”
data and probably would not act deﬁnitively until late summer 2004 after a second committee hearing
on the issue.230
46In preparation for the February hearing on the association between antidepressant drug treatment and
youth suicide, Dr. Laughren, the team leader of the Division of Neuropharmacological Drug Products,
circulated a memorandum providing background information to the PDAC and Peds AC committee
members.231 In it, he emphasized the importance of careful, thoughtful consideration of the matter at
hand.232 Laughren stressed that erring in either direction would be costly.233 A failure to identify an
increased risk of suicidality in children would give people a false sense of safety, but on the other hand, a
premature decision that there is such an increased risk could result in reducing or eliminating availability
of signiﬁcant treatments for a debilitating condition.234
The memo stated that, as mentioned above, Prozac is the only SSRI proven to be eﬀective in the pediatric
population.235 Although the focus on the committee was on the safety of SSRIs, proof of their eﬃcacy
or lack thereof in the given population is signiﬁcant because ultimately the risks and beneﬁts will be
weighed to determine whether the drug is appropriate for pediatric use.236 Thus, the lack of proven
eﬃcacy of most SSRIs in children was relevant to the advisory committee’s deliberations.237 That said,
Laughren noted that absence of proof of eﬃcacy is not equivalent to proof of ineﬀectiveness in FDA’s
eyes, thus leaving open the possibility that future studies could establish eﬀectiveness for other drugs
that have not yet shown beneﬁts in children.238
In seeking to establish whether or not a link with suicidality exists, FDA is reviewing 20 studies of eight
antidepressants, involving more than 4,100 patients under the age of 18.239 No suicides occurred in the
course of the studies, but early analyses, including the one conducted by the British health authorities,
suggest a possible increase in suicide risk for patients taking these drugs.240
47The task of ﬁguring out whether SSRIs lead to suicidality in children is complicated by the lack of
standardization of measurements and methods for assessing suicidality across diﬀerent studies. The
clinical studies under FDA review may not have been conducted in a way that adequately assesses
patients for emergent suicidality or that allows aggregating the results of those studies.241 Idiosyncratic
classiﬁcation of events of concern by clinicians may have resulted in some teen-agers and children being
inaccurately labeled as suicidal.242
For example, diﬀerent researchers appear to have varying standards for symptoms that constitute “inju-
rious behavior;” at one end of the spectrum is a self-inﬂicted gun wound, which clearly indicates interest
in suicide, whereas at the other end of the spectrum is a slap to one’s own face, which may indicate no
suicidal intent at all.243 Another example is that out of the 19 children classiﬁed as cutting themselves,
most cut themselves only superﬁcially, resulting in little bleeding.244 Whether or not such conduct
should be classiﬁed as suicidal is an open question.
In an attempt to make sense of this data and to obtain guidance on how the agency and physicians
should proceed, FDA has retained the services of an outside group from Columbia University to review,
reclassify, and reanalyze inconsistent summary data the agency has received from makers of the antide-
pressants under scrutiny.245 Part of the task assigned the advisory committee was to oﬀer advice on the
development of guidance for more adequate assessment of suicidality in future studies.246
48During the February 2nd panel, as at the similar panel in 1991, the physicians and other experts on the
advisory committees heard impassioned pleas and supporting evidence from various parties. Approxi-
mately 450 people attended, and 54 spoke during the Open Public Hearing session.247 On the one hand,
dozens of relatives of youngsters who either committed or attempted suicide while on SSRIs testiﬁed
before the panel that antidepressant drugs that were supposed to help these children were responsible
for harming them instead. They blamed FDA for failing to warn physicians, parents, and children of the
risk inherent in SSRIs. On the other hand, mental health experts asserted as they did in the 1991 hear-
ings that leaving depression untreated is far more dangerous than prescribing SSRI treatment. These
opponents of further regulation also presented scientiﬁc evidence tending to show that SSRIs are in fact
not the cause of suicidality. They urged FDA to act cautiously, if at all, in limiting access to these
potentially very helpful drugs.
a. Testimony in Favor of Additional FDA Action
49Proponents of stronger warning labels on SSRIs regarding the risks to children claim that numerous
studies and experience prove that SSRIs can lead previously non-suicidal youth to think about killing
themselves. They attribute this change in thought and behavioral patterns to a “stimulation” or “acti-
vation” eﬀect the drugs have on children’s brains.248 Whereas before treatment a depressed child may
simply not had the energy to even consider suicide, SSRIs may “jump-start” a disturbed youth and
cause them to have, and to act on, self-injurious fantasies.
The sentiments of Tom Woodward, whose 17-year-old daughter Julie hanged herself after being on Zoloft
for one week, are representative of many of the witnesses who urged FDA action by relating personal
experiences.249 Julie Woodward had no history of self-harm or suicide, nor did the family have a history
of depression or suicide. She had been excited about attending college and had scored a 1,300 on her
SATs weeks before her death. Mr. Woodward said that the prescribing physicians stressed the safety
of Zoloft and failed to mention any possibility of suicide or other violence. He stated, “We are 100%
convinced that Zoloft killed our daughter,” and he accused FDA of playing politics and catering to the
ﬁnancial interests of the pharmaceutical industry by failing to require warnings earlier. He lobbied for
compelling the drug companies to produce all results of clinical studies, including negative ones, and for
funding such studies with public funds.250
50An attorney from a plaintiﬀs’ ﬁrm that represents thousands of SSRI patients in cases against drug
companies also presented compelling testimony. Karen Barth Menzies, of the law ﬁrm Baum, Hedlund,
Aristei, Guilford & Schiavo, reminded the panel of the agency’s regulatory mandate to require drug
companies to amend their labeling to contain warnings “as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an
association of a serious hazard with a drug; a causal relationship need not have been proved” (italics
added).251 She asserted that in addition to the link with suicidality that is currently being questioned,
SSRIs’s link with other serious adverse eﬀects like akathisia (severe restlessness), psychosis, and mania is
more established. She believes that there can be no doubt that there already exists reasonable evidence
of a connection between SSRIs and several serious hazards, including suicide, and thus she called on
FDA to warn the public immediately. Her testimony concluded with the plea, “Put me out of business
for the right reasons; warn about these drugs.”252
Dr. Glenmullen, oft-cited in this paper, ﬂew to Washington, DC, for the hearings to air his criticism
of FDA for its paternalism regarding patients.253 Citing his clinical experience as proof, he asserted
that informing patients of possible risks will not frighten them away from treatment, as advocates of
the status quo claim. He deplored the lack of regulatory action by the agency in the decade-plus that
had passed since the 1991 hearings, despite gathering evidence of a causal connection between SSRIs
and akathisia, a condition which in his words “can make some patients so agitated that they feel death
would be a welcome relief.”254
b. Opposition to Additional FDA Action
51People who did not want FDA to require a warning on SSRIs appeared to receive a boost for their argu-
ments when days before the February 2nd hearing, the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology
(ACNP) released a widely-publicized report stating that SSRIs do not increase the risk of suicidality
in youth.255 This special task force reviewed drug company-sponsored trials involving almost 2,000
children, including all published studies as well as some unpublished data provided to the British reg-
ulatory agency.256 The group found that there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the number of children
exhibiting suicidal thoughts or behavior when on Prozac, Paxil, Zoloft, or Celexa, versus children on
placebo.257 The ACNP task force concluded that in fact, the increased use of SSRIs appears to have
lowered worldwide suicide rates; the rate of child suicide in 15 countries has declined by an average of
33% over the past decade and a half, during which time SSRI use has increased greatly.258 That said, the
committee emphasized that its ﬁndings were preliminary and were based on limited amounts of data.259
The inconclusive nature of the ACNP report was emphasized during the advisory committee hearings,
when FDA acknowledged for conﬂicts of interest purposes that one member of PDAC and one FDA
presenter were on the ACNP task force that issued the report.260
At the hearing, a psychiatrist representing the National Alliance of the Mentally Ill cautioned against
limiting access to SSRIs, citing the Surgeon General for the statistic that 80% of youth who need mental
health treatment receive none at all. 261 She oﬀered personal testimony as well to illustrate the signiﬁ-
cant good SSRIs do for children and the harm further restrictions on their use would cause. Her two sons
had shown self-injurious tendencies before going on SSRIs, but with proper SSRI treatment, both were
leading full and functional lives.262 She said she “shudder[s] to think of their plight if these medications
were not available.”263 Many others urged regulatory caution as well, as in 1991, claiming that parents
might be afraid to put their children on antidepressants due to exaggerated reports of their risks.
524. Advisory Committee Recommendations and FDA Action
After reviewing relevant materials and hearing 10 hours of testimony, the FDA panel comprising PDAC
and Peds AC issued its recommendation. It advised FDA to issue promptly stronger warnings to physi-
cians about the possible risks to children posed by antidepressants, rather than wait until the agency’s
review is completed in late summer.264
53The committee emphasized the need to warn pediatricians and family practitioners, among other health-
care workers,265 reﬂecting the concern expressed by many that non-psychiatric physicians sometimes
misuse antidepressants as a line of ﬁrst defense for children who appear depressed. The committee fur-
ther recommended that FDA’s warning explicitly state the need for close follow-up and monitoring of
emergent side eﬀects at the beginning of treatment of children.266 Dr. Wayne K. Goodman, a mem-
ber of the advisory committee and the chairman of psychiatry at the University of Florida College of
Medicine, explained that the panel was particularly troubled by reports that some doctors were giving
patients samples of antidepressants without scheduling follow-up appointment to ensure that patients
were tolerating the drugs.267
Moreover, the committee stated that the proven eﬃcacy of SSRIs for treating pediatric depression is less
compelling than many of its members were previously aware, and that the risk-beneﬁt calculus must be
adjusted accordingly, echoing concerns expressed in Dr. Laughren’s background memo.268 Worried that
similar lack of awareness pervades the rest of the health care community and leads to over-prescription of
SSRIs, the committee recommended that FDA publicize the fact that the vast majority of randomized
controlled trials fail to show superiority over placebo in treating MDD in children.269 Dr. Matthew
Rudorfer, Chairman of the PDAC and a scientist at the NIMH, stated that such a warning would serve
to alert physicians to warning signs of suicidal or other violent thinking or behavior, but that it would
not discourage them from prescribing the drugs.270
54As in 1991, FDA followed its advisory committee’s advice. On March 22nd, the agency issued a public
health advisory requesting SSRI manufacturers to include in their labels a warning statement that
recommends close monitoring of patients on these drugs for signs of suicidality.271 FDA went even
farther than the committee recommendations by asking for warnings regarding both pediatric and adult
patients, despite the hearing’s focus on children alone.272 The public health advisory puts healthcare
providers, patients, and families on notice to be particularly vigilant for signs of worsening depression or
suicidal inclinations both when starting antidepressant therapy and when changing doses.273 Dr. Katz
of the CDER said that the proposed warning label will “include information about behavioral changes
that may occur in patients who are prescribed antidepressant drugs” so that doctors and others will be
attuned to warning signs.274 FDA has still not concluded that antidepressants cause suicidality, but
it is continuing to review available data on the issue and expects to update the advisory committees
regarding its ﬁndings later this summer.275
555. Public Reaction and Critique of 2004 Hearing
Public reaction to FDA’s request for a warning on SSRI labels was predictably mixed. Healthcare
professionals familiar with the issue hoped that the warnings would encourage greater understanding of
SSRI risks and closer monitoring of patients by doctors, but at the same time some worried that the
warning would discourage patients desperately in need of psychiatric help from seeking treatment.276
Dr. James H. Scully, Jr., medical director of the American Psychiatric Association, expressed his worry
that primary care physicians (PCPs) might also lose conﬁdence in the drugs and stop prescribing them
altogether, despite the need for PCPs to continue to help combat depression with all available tools.277
Critics of FDA inaction on the issue up to this point must have been pleased by the sheer amount of press
the agency’s advisory received. Even the non-scientiﬁc, popular magazine People published a feature
article in the wake of the FDA warning. 278 The article focused on the suicide of the aforementioned
Julie Woodward, the rising high school senior who killed herself shortly after starting to take Zoloft, and
her family’s eﬀorts to alert people to the risks of SSRIs.279 Such media attention no doubt has helped
to spread the message to many who were previously unaware that antidepressants are not necessarily as
safe as previously assumed. However, many critics believe that FDA’s request for warnings about the
risk of suicide posed by SSRIs was both tardy and insuﬃcient, and such concerns led to a Congressional
investigation of the matter.
566. Congressional Oversight of FDA Regulation of SSRI Use in Minors
57The House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations launched
an investigation in early February 2004 to determine what FDA knew about pediatric suicidal tendencies
potentially caused by SSRIs, and when it knew such information. 280 On March 24th, Representatives
Joe Barton of Texas and James Greenwood of Pennsylvania sent a letter to FDA Commissioner Mark
McClellan seeking answers. The letter stated that “the Committee is interested in learning the rationale
for FDA’s decision not to require stronger warnings on the labeling for pediatric use of an anti-depressant
product when, for example, [GlaxoSmithKline’s] own analysis of their data indicates an increased risk of
suicide-related behavior in children.” 281 FDA was also asked to justify its decision in light of the more
rapid and protective action taken by the British regulatory authorities to limit the prescription of SSRIs
to children in that country.282 The letter requested from the agency a long list of documents related to
the safety and eﬃcacy of antidepressants in minors, including the following: intra-agency emails about
suicide risk, communications between FDA and SSRI manufacturers on the same topic, and internal
records pertaining to particular oﬃcial FDA actions, including the June 2003 advisory on Paxil and the
October 2003 advisory on possible eﬀects of SSRIs on the pediatric population.283
Further, Barton and Greenwood inquired about allegations that FDA had suppressed ﬁndings of an
internal study ﬁnding a causal connection between SSRI use and pediatric suicidality that would have
been relevant to the February hearings. 284 It turns out that the agency did in fact bar the testimony
of Dr. Andrew Mosholder, an FDA epidemiologist who had reviewed the pediatric clinical data and
concluded that antidepressant treatment increases the risk of suicide in children.285 In 2003, the agency
assigned Dr. Mosholder the task of analyzing the more than 20 studies that the drug companies had
submitted to determine whether a link with pediatric suicide exists, and in January 2004, he submitted
a lengthy memo concluding that children taking antidepressants are almost twice as likely as those on
placebo to become suicidal.286 He urged his FDA colleagues to discourage doctors from prescribing all
antidepressants (except for the proven-eﬀective Prozac) to children.287
58However, FDA higher-ups decided to keep Mosholder’s conclusions private, and to preclude his testimony
at the February 2nd advisory committee hearing, despite their previous intention to let him testify.288 Dr.
Robert Temple, FDA’s associate director of medical policy, defends the agency’s quelling of Mosholder’s
ﬁndings. He and others believe that Mosholder was insuﬃciently skeptical of reports of suicidal behavior
contained in the drug companies’ studies, and that therefore his determinations are not substantiated.289
Temple sounded the now-familiar refrain: “It would have been entirely inappropriate to present as an
FDA conclusion an analysis of data that were not ripe...If you get it wrong and over-discourage use
of these medicines, people could die.”290 Critics of FDA like Dr. Glenmullen view FDA suppression of
Mosholder’s study and testimony as yet another example of agency misconduct; they say that given the
agency’s own evidence of a link between SSRIs and pediatric suicidality, FDA should have mandated a
stronger warning on the drugs’ labels.291
The Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations also appealed directly to the drug man-
ufacturers for more information that could help prove the existence or absence of suicidal side eﬀects of
SSRIs. On the day following the February FDA advisory committeee hearing, the subcommittee sent
letters to Pﬁzer, Wyeth, Eli Lilly, and GlaxoSmithKline soliciting all unpublished data concerning the
use of antidepressants in youth. 292 Granted, the drug companies had already provided FDA a great
deal of information pursuant to the pediatric exclusivity provision. However, Representative Greenwood
requested more information “in light of protecting the public health of children and/or the need to
expedite public and physician conﬁdence in the use of antidepressants.”293
59The subcommittee’s letter cites a January 29, 2004, article in The Washington Post that states that
makers of popular antidepressants have refused to disclose details of most pediatric clinical trials.294
The article notes that researchers familiar with the unpublished information say that most of the secret
studies show that the drugs are no more eﬀective than placebo in children.295 Although there is no
legal mandate to reveal negative data and despite a strong argument that even genuinely eﬀective
medicines sometimes do no better than placebo,296 Greenwood’s letter to the drug companies clearly
reﬂects a judgment that in this particular instance the public interest demands that all relevant data be
considered. A GlaxoSmithKline spokesperson said the company plans to comply with the request.297
This example of congressional involvement in a regulatory matter reveals both the signiﬁcant public
interest at stake as well as the substantial role the media plays in inﬂuencing policy.
VI. Conclusion
60Depression is a debilitating condition that individuals have suﬀered since the beginning of recorded
history. The de-stigmatization of mental illness and the discovery of SSRIs in the second half of the
twentieth century bode well for mankind’s ﬁght against depression. Despite signiﬁcant controversy over
the best ways to treat it, experts agree that the biggest problem in the treatment of depression is under-
diagnosis. The growing recognition that mental illness does not represent a moral failing encourages more
people to seek treatment. Drug companies’ eﬀorts to push their products, via advertisements as well as
“public interest” campaigns, also help to promote awareness of depression and available treatments for
it. This paper has chronicled and analyzed several aspects of FDA regulation of one type of treatment for
depression, namely the class of antipressants known as SSRIs, and it has shown some of the challenges
SSRIs pose for the regulatory regime both in the approval and post-market phases.
On the whole, FDA has made commendable eﬀorts to ensure that SSRIs available to the American public
are suﬃciently safe and eﬀective, and that their beneﬁts outweigh their risks. The agency has allowed
widespread access to these promising antidepressant drugs while alerting prescribers and patients to
their known risks. The regulated industry and other interested parties have strong yet disparate views
of the beneﬁts and risk of antidepressants, thereby complicating FDA’s job. Ultimately the agency is
bound by its statutory and regulatory mandates and by scientiﬁc evidence,298 as the continuing saga
involving a potential link between SSRIs and suicide illustrates: FDA resisted requiring suicide warnings
on SSRI labels for over a decade, despite intense public pressure, but then reversed this position when
the weight of the science before it necessitated a warning. Although science is determinative, FDA must
also be sure to maintain the high level of trust the public has in the agency by conducting its proceedings
in a way that appear open and fair. Congressional oversight of FDA regulation and the involvement of
advisory committees help to guide agency discretion and lend legitimacy to its processes.
61This paper has shown several examples of how the regulatory process evolves and improves when its
shortcomings are recognized. For example, in response to calls for more systematic reporting of adverse
eﬀects of drugs, FDA started its MEDWatch program. Similarly, when concerns arose about treating
children with drugs that had never been tested on children, Congress acted to stimulate clinical testing on
that population by enacting the pediatric exclusivity provision, which has resulted in a ﬂurry of pediatric
studies by the drug manufacturers. At times, public opinion can inﬂuence the regulated industry directly,
for instance, when the pharmaceutical industry responded to criticism of the short duration of its clinical
trials of SSRIs by voluntarily undertaking longer trials than are suggested by FDA guidelines.
That said, there are many areas for improvement in the regulatory process. The increasing inﬂuence the
drug industry wields over academic research is disturbing and should be addressed through legislation
or regulation. In addition, FDA, the industry, and academic researchers should work together to hone
the way they evaluate the eﬃcacy of antidepressants in animals and humans, and in particular, to create
a more objective yardstick than the existing Hamilton scale. Further, at least in cases where there is
some legitimate concern about a drug’s serious adverse eﬀects like suicide or other types of death, drug
companies should be required to make all clinical studies available to FDA so that the agency can review
all relevant information in deciding how best to protect the public.
62Additionally, although MEDWatch is clearly superior to the absence of any reporting system, greater
post-marking monitoring of drugs is needed. For example, FDA should require longitudinal studies on
antidepressants after drugs are on the market. Ideally, FDA would beef up post-market monitoring of
drugs, but of course this type of regulatory would require signiﬁcant extra resources. In addition, FDA
should take great pains to allow and encourage people with views opposed to those of the drug industry
to present their stance to the agency on controversial topics to avoid any appearance of impropriety.
Following both the 1991 and 2004 hearings on the potential connection between antidepressants and
suicide, the press reported that FDA eﬀectively silenced certain individuals whose views were antithetical
to the industry. In 1991, the inﬂuential Dr. Teicher was allowed to give only an abbreviated informal
presentation, and in 2004 FDA’s own scientist Dr. Mosholder was not permitted to testify at all. Of
course there is a ﬁnite amount time for testimony at these hearings and FDA cannot be expected to
allow every person a formal presentation, but the agency should be aware of its responsibilities not only
to actually be fair in the evidence it considers, but also to appear to the public to be fair.
Some people have pointed to the fact that PCPs often wrongly prescribe SSRIs as evidence of failure
of FDA regulation. It is true that PCPs with minimal training in psychiatry write the vast majority
of prescriptions for SSRIs; a 1997 source reports that PCPs are responsible for as many as 70% of
antidepressant prescriptions.299 Many generalist physicians and even mental health specialists do not
know the risks of SSRIs and thus prescribe them to patients who may not need them on the assumption
that the drugs are entirely safe. Supporting this assertion, a British study found that only 30% of PCPs
and 72% of psychiatrists surveyed in England know that patients can experience severe withdrawal
symptoms when they stop taking SSRIs.300
63That said, FDA should not shoulder the brunt of the blame for doctors’ prescribing habits. The FDA-
approved labels for SSRIs contain numerous precautions that should alert doctors to the risks of the
medications. For example, regarding withdrawal eﬀects, the Paxil label states: “A gradual reduction
in the dose rather than abrupt cessation is recommended wherever possible,”301 so that anybody who
reads the label carefully should realize that there are risks to going oﬀ the drugs too quickly. Similarly,
FDA’s numerous public health announcements over the past couple of years, as well as its request for a
warning about suicide on SSRI labels, should serve to make doctors and patients more aware that these
drugs are not entirely safe.
Some type of regulatory restriction on the distribution of antidepressants would indeed help to curb
the problem of mis-prescription of antidepressants and inadequate follow-up by physicians who have
insuﬃcient knowledge of psychotropic drugs. However, for FDA to take on the responsibility of restricting
distribution, the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act would have to be amended to grant the agency this
authority, and it is unlikely such an amendment would pass. Thus, self-regulation by the medical
profession on this subject is preferable to additional governmental regulation. In other words, rather
than pushing for additional regulation of SSRIs, critics of physicians’ prescription practices should look
instead to further educating medical students or current physicians about appropriate use of SSRIs.
64In conclusion, despite unique challenges presented to FDA regulation by SSRIs, the agency has done a
good job overall of balancing the need for access to these medicines with the need to warn of their risks.
FDA has aﬀorded opportunity for most interested parties to be heard in the course of its deliberations
over whether to require a suicide warning, and it has responded appropriately based on available scientiﬁc
evidence and the advice of its advisory committees. That said, SSRI regulation could be improved by
advances in the methods employed in clinical trials, greater post-market monitoring, and increased
participation by drug industry critics in the regulatory process. Finally, the medical profession rather
than FDA should be responsible for reducing the unnecessary prescriptions of these potentially risky
drugs.
65